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Creation of the CIA Essay Example for Free
Creation of the CIA EssayDespite the popular perceptions generated by Tom Clancy novels and James Bond movies, American discussion gathering was non a dusty warfare invention it has existed since the Republics founding. George Washington organized his confess tidings unit during the Revolutionary War, sending spies behind foeman lines and overseeing counterespionage operations. In 1790, just three years after the Constitutional Convention, Congress ack outrightledged executive prerogative to conduct in produceation service operations and gave then-President Washington a secret unvouchered fund for spies, if the gentleman so pleases. 1 give-and-take has been a component of American foreign policy ever since.More important for our purposes, Americas growing amour in world affairs during the late nineteenth and archaeozoic twentieth centuries led to the establishment of several permanent perception cheeks. In 1882, the Office of ocean newsworthiness (ONI) was created and charged with collecting technical data about foreign navy ships and weapons. Three years later, the Department of War established its own recognition unit the Military intelligence information course of instruction (MID). In 1908, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened its doors. By the 1930s, the FBI had become the nations preeminent counterespionage agency and had branched into caterpillar track intelligence activities in Latin America.2The State Department, meanwhile, had developed an expertise and a mission, which focused on overt information collection. Finally, several critical events sparked the creation of a new war clock eon primal intelligence agency nether the sound out Chiefs of Staff, the Office of strategic Services (OSS), which collected information, analyzed raw intelligence, and carried out a order of unrevealed, subversive operations abroad from propaganda, to sabotage, to para forces operations. By the end of World War II, these five bureaucrati c actors were vying for their own place in the postwar intelligence atomic number 18na.3 This was merely the same straightforward War versus navy blue Department environment that gave rise to the field Security Council scheme or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.It is frequently cited that former(prenominal) President Truman never thought that when he created the CIA it would ever be involved in peacetime silver screen operations. In 1964 Allen Dulles, one of the most influential Directors of cardinal intuition in CIA history, challenged Trumans remarks, saying that although Truman did not care for dirty Gestapo tactics, the CIA had certainly performed them during his government activity.4 This paper depart chronicle the transformation of the Office of strategical Services (OSS) into the fundamental experience Agency. It also will examine how and why the peacetime Central Intelligence Agency came to possess many of the same powers as its wartime predecessor. In particular this paper will focus on the OSS legacy of behind-the-scenes operations and how the CIA inherited that legacy.The Creation of CIADuring World War II, the OSS wielded broad powers, including clandestine intelligence gathering and cover charge governmental warfare. William Donovan, Director of the OSS, exhorted the United States to maintain the OSS or a limiting facsimile of it in the post-war period. The end of the war and the reminder of another secret organization that waged covert policy-making warfare, the Nazi Gestapo, influenced President Truman to dissolve the OSS. However, as the United States gradually entered the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the necessity of a peacetime intelligence agency became apparent. To bear upon the need, Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in 1946.5In 1947 Congress transformed the CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The powers of the CIA increased dramatically as U.S. policymakers began to perceive an change magnitu de threat of Soviet-Communists bent on world domination. By 1952 the CIA closely resembled the wartime OSS, having the same way and capabilities. At the same time the War Crimes trial runs were being conducted at Nuremberg, American intelligence officers were secretly interviewing high-ranking German officers to determine their potential usefulness in supplying intelligence on the Soviet Union.Three critical events were solid influences on the Truman Administration officials who founded and built the CIA. The first was the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl deem, which demonstrated that the United States was unprepared, not for want of information, but because no apparatus existed to filter and analyze the large volume of available information in a way that could produce accurate intelligence. This infamous intelligence loser clearly demonstrated that the security of the United States would be greatly compromised until it developed a peacetime fundamentalized intelligence agenc y.6The second significant event was Stalins seizure of political and soldiery control of most of Eastern Europe in violation of his wartime lowstanding with the Allied Powers. The fighting in Europe had only recently finish when American and foreign reports on Soviet activities in the occupied territories began to distress leaders in Washington, London, and other capitals. The third event concerned the sponsorship by Soviet and Chinese Communists of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. This sponsorship heightened Cold War tensions and strengthened the conviction of policy makers to buttress the CIAs power to fight communism. Pearl Harbor illustrated the need for a peacetime central intelligence service and the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union galvanized the Truman Administration to create a peacetime intelligence organization with quasi-wartime powers.During World War II, the United States created the first American centralized intelligence agency, the Office of Strat egic Services (OSS). On June 13, 1942, a Military Order issued by President Roosevelt created the OSS and granted it broad powers that included intelligence analysis, clandestine collection, and paramilitary, psychological and political warfare.7 The agency operated under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was devoted to the business of sabotage, espionage, counterespionage, and covert action, hallmarks that would be passed on to its successor, the CIA. The OSS was involved in both intelligence gathering and clandestine political warfare. To combine both of these capabilities in one agency, Donovan assigned unlike functions to separate branches of the OSS. Three of the main branches of the OSS were Special Operations (SO), conundrum Intelligence (SI), and Counterintelligence (X-2).8The OSS was extremely successful in carrying out covert operations. The first important OSS covert operation was conducted in North Africa. Several assassinations, allegedly including that of Vichy French Admiral Darlan, were carried out by the Morale and Special Operation departments of the Psychological Warfare Division of the OSS. The success of the operation earned the burgeoning agency great respect and notoriety, especially in regards to covert action. The CIA would concisely inherit the OSSs wartime experience and assassination methods.9 The OSS was also unmistakably successful in setting up and maintaining clandestine agents in Thailand. The OSS established a solid foundation for future CIA activities in the Southeast Asia.10Even early in World War II, paramilitary and political covert operations gained support of high-level figures, such as Roosevelt and Eisenhower, and began to eclipse the accomplishments of intelligence collection. The OSS emphasis on covert paramilitary operations would be one of the patriarchal legacies passed on to the CIA As historian John Ranelagh noted, The benefits of covert paramilitary action in peacetime tended to be favorably re garded on the basis of a romantic recollection of these wartime experiences of the OSS.11 Perhaps the most important legacy the OSS bestowed upon the CIA was that of former OSS personnel who filled the ranks of the fledgling CIA with experient intelligence officers. Four OSS veterans, Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and William Casey, went on to become Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency.Throughout the war, the OSS proved to be invaluable in both intelligence collection and covert operations, clearly illustrating the advantages of combining these both capabilities in one agency. In 1944 President Franklin Roosevelt requested a secret memorandum on the subject of a postwar intelligence service from General Donovan, OSS chief. Donovan exhorted President Roosevelt to create a permanent, worldwide intelligence service after the wars end. Donovan anticipated the Cold War struggle When our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace.12 Donovan went on to argue that the OSS had the expert and specialized personnel undeniable for the task. This talent should not be dispersed.13Donovans proposal was foiled by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), J. Edgar Hoover, who wanted the FBI to beget the exclusive right to collect and analyze intelligence on a global level. Hoover obtained a copy of Donovans proposal for a postwar intelligence service and leaked the top-secret document to the Chicago Tribune. The newspaper printed a number of inflammatory stories about Donovans design to create a super-spy network. Congressional uproar, no mistrust spurred by the bad press, caused the peacetime central intelligence agency proposal to be shelved.14 The cautious Roosevelt was optimistic about Donovans plan, but offered no guarantees. After Roosevelts death and the close of the war, President Truman stated in a letter to Donovan that said he would liquidat e those wartime activities of the Office of Strategic Services which will not be needed in time of peace.15 Truman feared Donovans proposed centralized peacetime intelligence agency might one day be used to spy on Americans.16However, the reminders of Pearl Harbor and the escalate Soviet aggressions do Truman realize that the United States could no longer deny its role as a world leader and, as such, it would require a formidable centralized intelligence agency. Even before Truman abolished the OSS, he recognized the necessity and requested proposals for the creation of an organization to collate and set up intelligence.17 Upon learning of Trumans plan to disband the OSS and transfer functions to separate agencies, Donovan sent a memorandum to President Truman, on September 13, 1945, pleading that in the national saki, and in your own interest as the Chief Executive, that you will not permit this to be done.18President Truman, ignoring Donovans objections, issued Executive Order 9621 on September 20, 1945, titled Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions.19 According to the Order, the State Department took over the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, while the War Department adopted the remnants of the OSS clandestine collection and counterintelligence branches, which it named the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The capability that the wartime OSS had developed to perform subversive operations abroad was officially abandoned.20In December 1945 Truman deliberated proposals from both the State Department and the Joint Chiefs for a new centralized intelligence agency. Truman ultimately opted for a diluted version of the more simplistic and workable Joint Chiefs proposal.21 The result was the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) on January 22, 1946. Naval Reserve Rear Admiral Sidney Souers was selected to be the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). President Truman invited Souers to the White home two da ys after creating the CIG to award him a black cloak and dagger as symbols of his new office.22The CIG was drastically understaffed, consisting primarily of officers borrowed from the State Department and the military services. The new agency was only a shadow of the wartime OSS. The CIG had no authorization to collect clandestine foreign information from agents in the field or to form a consensus based on information gathered from other intelligence agencies. The primary function of the agency was to coordinate the flow of intelligence to policymakers. Truman seek to conserve covert action, a prominent part of the OSS, out of this peacetime agency.23In reference to the directing creating the CIG, Truman stated, No police, justness enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under this directive.24 Compromises in the Joint Chiefs plan to appease the State Department and the Bureau of the Budget had made the CIG an interdepartmental body that lacked its own budg et and personnel.25 However, President Truman greatly appreciated the Daily Summary produced by the CIG. The Daily Summary was prepared according to Trumans own ad hocations, and when complete satisfied his requirements, it saved him the time of having to search by the hundreds of intelligence reports that normally flooded into the White House.26Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, after five months as DCI, was replaced with U.S. Army Air Forces Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. DCI Vandenberg had an impressive military record and had the clout and ambition necessary to build the CIG into an agency that wielded great power. In just one year as Director, Vandenberg broadened the CIGs power to incorporate an autonomous budget and work force and won the authority to collect and analyze, as well as collate, intelligence. The CIG expanded in importance as the United States attempted to contain the Soviet Union in Europe.27At this point, all sides thought the intelligence battle was over. Donovan and OSS were out of the picture, the State Department had come back into the fold, and the chairwoman had created a Central Intelligence Group, which left each department to run its own intelligence affairs. As Truman and his warring military services now glowering to drafting a compromise military unification bill, the intelligence consensus was clear any formula should include aliment codifying the presidents CIG directive. Doing so would freeze the existing intelligence system into law, insulating it from the whims or desires of future political players. On this much, at least, the War and Navy departments agreed.28The Central Intelligence Group did not. Ink on the CIG directive had hardly dried before the agency began taking on a life and agenda of its own. CIGs problems were apparent from the start. During the early months of 1946, departmental intelligence services readily bypassed the central agency, sending their information and taking their case directly to the president They provided CIG with a small budget and a meager, mediocre staff. They refused to share raw intelligence and neglected the agencys efforts to reconcile or synthesize conflicting information. As Anne Karalekas writes, the intelligence units jealously guarded both their information and what they believed were their prerogatives in providing policy guidance to the President, making CIGs primary mission an exercise in futility.29 The problem was simple CIGs success hinged on the generosity of those who wanted it to fail. Trumans directive appeared to be working too well.Frustrated with their agencys impotence, CIG officials soon began pressing for substantial changes. In their capacity as depicted object Intelligence Authority members, the Secretaries of War, Navy and State granted some significant concessions. But these were not enough. In July of 1946, CIG General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston sent a draft Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency to the White House which sought-after(a) to transform CIG from a small planning staff to a legally established, fairly sizable, operating agency.30This move came as an alarming surprise to the White House, which was now deeply embroiled in the unification conflict. As Troy writes, In this perspective, where the White House had the difficult problem of getting generals and admirals to agree on a fundamental reorganization of their services, the legislative problem of the CIG must throw away seemedan unwelcome detail.31 As the War and Navy Departments moved towards compromise, the president and his legislative drafting aggroup hardened toward CIG. By January, when the military finally agreed to a comprehensive unification bill, the White House was in no mood to humor CIGs demands that the legislation specifically outline CIA functions, make the Director of Central Intelligence a statutory nonvoting member of the NSC, provide procurement authorities, or grant the CIA power to coordinate fo reign intelligence activities and operate centrally where appropriate. Such controversial measures threatened to reignite military opposition and reopen the entire unification conflict.32Thus, as CIG touch for more, the White House responded with less. On 26 February, the President submitted his draft National Security Act to Congress. It included only the barest mention of the CIA enough to transform the CIG directive into statutory law, and nothing more. In just 30 lines, the CIA section established the agency, placed it under the National Security Council, gave it a director appointed from civil or military life by the president (with the Senates consent), and authorized it to inherit the functions, personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group.33On March 12, 1947, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine, which was instrumental in determining the eventual shape of the CIA. Historian Harry Ransom stated, So, while Pearl Harbor may be considered the f ather of the CIA, the Truman Doctrine certainly was the mystify the OSS was the hero model.34 Britain had announced that it would withdraw from Greece, allowing it to fall to the Communists. Truman decided that the United States would take on the role of a world policeman to protect all nation from communist insurgency. In Trumans famous statement to Congress, he said, The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. He went on to state, I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by exterior pressures.35 These words would later justify the creation of a permanent intelligence agency with the power to wage political warfare in a time of peace.CIA provisions of the National Security Act went relatively unnoticed and unaltered in Congress. Instead, legislators concentrated on the more hotly contested aspect s of merging the two military departments issues like the power of the new Secretary of Defense and the protection of the Navys Marine Corps and aviation units. In the Senate, Armed Services Committee deliberations resulted in only two relatively minor changes to the proposed CIA, neither of which dealt with CIA functions or jurisdiction.36 In fact, the committees final report specifically noted that the Agency would continue to perform the duties adumbrate in Trumans CIG directive until Congress could pass permanent legislation at a later date.37The CIA which arose from the National Security Act of 1947 closely resembled its CIG predecessor. Like CIG, the CIA was hypothetic to correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence from other services, but was given no specific authority to collect intelligence on its own or to lock up in any covert subversive operations. Like CIG, the CIA operated under the watchful eyes of other intelligence producers where CIG reported to a National Intelligence Authority, the CIA operated under the National Security Council a committee including the Secretaries of War, Navy, State, Defense and the President. Mimicking the CIG directive, The National Security Act protected existing intelligence components with explicit guarantees. In deference to the FBI, the law barred the CIA from exercising any police, subpoena sic, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions. It also provided that the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence.38Finally, the Act borrowed two broad clauses from Trumans directive, which were to have a profound impact on the CIAs subsequent development. The new agency was charged with conducting such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines and with performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.39 Taken together, these CIA provisions created an agency, which suited War and Navy department interests to a tee. If CIG were any guide, the CIA would pose no threat to departmental intelligence agencies.ConclusionsHere, too, it appears that a study national security agency was forged without much Congressional input and without much consideration of broad national concerns. Like the National Security Council system and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency took shape almost exclusively within the executive branch, where bureaucratic players cared first and foremost about their own institutional interests.The CIA was clearly a product of executive branch discussions and decisions. All three rounds of the postwar intelligence battle were fought among bureaucratic actors and were ultimately decided by the president. plump out one, which pitted OSS chief Donovan against the State/Justice/Navy/War department coalitio n, ended with an executive order disbanding OSS and transferring its functions to the Departments of State and War. Round two featured internal warfare between top State Department officials and the military. It, too, ended with unilateral presidential action an executive directive which implemented the militarys recommendations for a weak Central Intelligence Group.In round three, it was CIG against the White House. With the entire unification bill hanging in the balance, and with military preferences about postwar intelligence well known, Truman and his legislative drafting team took decisive action. Rebuffing CIGs advances, they introduced a National Security Act bill which included brief, vague CIA provisions. Their aim was to continue CIG under new, statutory authority while generating as little controversy as possible.40Truman succeeded, thanks in large part to Congressional indifference. Legislators in both chambers accepted CIA provisions with little comment or debate. Thou gh a few Members raised alarms about the Agencys potential police power and broad jurisdiction, these voices were whispers against the wind. Average legislators had little incentive to probe deeply into CIA design, while national security intellectuals had bigger fish to fry in the unification bill. Tellingly, even those who pressed for a more specific CIA mandate ended up simply copying from Trumans CIG directive of 1946. It seems that even here, legislators were content to defer to the executive. The QA which emerged bore an uncanny resemblance to the Central Intelligence Group. Truman himself writes that the National Security Act succeeded in renaming the Central Intelligence Group implying the Act made no substantive changes to CIGs design or operations at all.41 in that location can also be little doubt that the Central Intelligence Agency was forged out of parochial, rather than national, interests. Creating any kind of postwar central intelligence apparatus inevitably benef ited some bureaucratic actors and threatened others. While OSS and CIG had much to gain by a strongly centralized system, the Departments of State, Justice, War and Navy all stood to lose. For these big four departments, promoting U.S. national security was never a paramount concern. Instead, these departments sought a central intelligence system which, above all, insulated their own intelligence services from outside interference. Paradoxically, their vision of an effective central intelligence agency was one without strong central control or coordination. The ideal CIA was a weak CIA.But why did these departments succeed? Why did the president so readily accept their vision of postwar intelligence organization? The short suffice is that Harry Truman needed the military services more than they needed him. Propelled by national interest, the president had placed military consolidation at the top of his political agenda. To him, no issue was more vital to American postwar security t han unifying the War and Navy Departments into a single Department of Defense, and no expenditure was too great to achieve success. In this context, Donovans vision of a powerful statutory CIA never had a chance. From day one, War and Navy leaders strenuously opposed such a scheme. With no political capital to spare, the president went along. His executive actions and legislative recommendations all sought to create a central intelligence apparatus, which protected departmental intelligence units, rather than ensuring the new central agency would function well.BibliographyAmbrose, Stephen E. Ikes Spies Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. New York Doubleday, 1981.Andrew, Christopher. For the presidents eyes only Secret intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush. New York HarperCollins, 1995.Cline, Ray S. The CIA Under Reagan, Bush, and Casey The growing of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan. Washington, D.C. Acropolis Books, 1981.Caraley, Demetrios. T he politics of military unification A study of conflict and the policy process. New York capital of South Carolina University Press, 1966.Dunlop, Richard. Donovan Americas Master Spy. Chicago Rand McNally, 1982.Lowenthal, Mark. U.S. Intelligence Evolution and anatomy. 2d ed. Westport Praeger, 1992.Donovan, Robert. Conflict and Crisis The administration of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948. New York Norton, 1977.Karalekas, Anne. History of the Central Intelligence Agency. In The Central Intelligence Agency History and documents, edited by William M. Leary. University, A.L. University of Alabama Press, 1984.Ransom, Harry Howe. The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1970.Sayle, Edward F. 1986. The historical underpinning of the U.S. intelligence community. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1.Smith, R. Harris. OSS The Secret History of America. First Central Intelligence Agency. Berkeley. University of California Press, 1972.T ruman, Harry S. Memoirs Years of Trial and Hope. New York Doubleday, 1956.Troy, Thomas F. Donovan and the CIA A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C Central Intelligence Agency, 1981.1 Andrew, Christopher. For the presidents eyes only Secret intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush. (New York HarperCollins, 1995), 112 Sayle, Edward F. The historical underpinning of the U.S. intelligence community. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1. 1986.3 Andrew4 Stephen E. Ambrose, Ikes Spies Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (New York Doubleday, 1981), 178.5 John Ranelagh, The Agency The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York Simon and Schuster, 1986), 28-30.6 Ibid., 33-57 Ray S. Cline, The CM Under Reagan, Bush and Casey The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan (Washington, D.C. Acropolis Books, 1981), 71.8 Ibid.9 Ranelagh, 8810 Ibid., 94.11 Ibid., 96.12 Quoted in R. Harris Smith, OSS The Secret History of Americas First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley University of California Press, 1972), 383.13 Ibid.14 Ambrose, 162-64.15 Truman to Donovan, 20 September 1945, United States, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Cold War Records The CIA under Harry Truman, (Washington, DC U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 15. Here on cited as CIA Cold War Records.16 Richard Dunlop, Donovan Americas Master Spy (Chicago Rand McNally, 1982), 467-68.17 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Years of Trial and Hope (New York Doubleday, 1956), 73-76.18 William J. Donovan, Memorandum for the President, 13 September 1945, CIA Cold War Records, 319 Ranelagh, 9920 Cline21 Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for Commander Clifford, 27 December 1945, CIA Cold War Records, 17-19.22 Ambrose, 127.23 Cline24 CIA Cold War Records, 30.25 Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C. Central Intelligence Agency, 1981), 346.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28 Mark Lowenthal, U.S. intelligence Evolution and anatomy. 2d ed. (Westport Praeger, 1992), 167-929 Anne Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency. In The Central Intelligence Agency History and documents, edited by William M. Leary. (University, A.L. University of Alabama Press, 1984). 2430 Elsey, George M, Papers. Harry S. Truman Library. Quoted in Demetrios Caraley, The politics of military unification A study of conflict and the policy process (New York Columbia University Press, 1966), 56.31 Troy, 37132 Ibid, 378-933 Lowenthal, 191-5.34 Harry Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, M.A. Harvard University Press, 1970), 83.35 Quoted in Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948 (New York Norton, 1977), 284.36 First, the committee voted to make the president a statutory National Security Council member. Since the CIA reported to the NSC, this move theoretically gave the CIA greater presidential access th an in the first place planned. However, it still fell far short of granting the agency a private channel to the president, especially since the president was not required to attend NSC meetings. Second, the Committee made clear that civils, as well as military, were eligible for appointment as Director of Central Intelligence the presidents bill did not rule out civilian appointments, but did not specifically mention them (Troy 1981 380-90).37 Troy, 39538 Cold War Records, 131-5.39 CIA Cold War Records, 177-8.40 Lowenthal, 17641 Truman, 56-7
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